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In early 2010 we proposed the creation of a “Euro-
pean Monetary Fund”.Later,in May of that year the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was
created and became a funding vehicle without being
a real “fund” (i.e., an organisation with its own pro-
fessional staff and professional autonomy).This may
change now given that the French and German lead-
ers have proposed in their joint letter to the Presi-
dent of the European Council, Herman Van Rom-
puy, increasing the analytical capacity of the EFSF,
which until now had relied almost exclusively on the
work of the Commission and the detailed decisions
of its board of finance ministry representatives.
It seems as if the EFSF is now becoming in institu-
tional terms more similar to the IMF. But the
changes to the EFSF’s field of action have been even
more impressive,especially since the European Coun-
cil of 21 July 2011, whereupon French President
Nicolas Sarkozy proudly declared that euro area
leaders “have agreed to create the beginnings of a
European Monetary Fund”.1
Unfortunately the decision to allow the EFSF to
engage in secondary market purchases and provide
precautionary financing was not followed by a
reduction in market tensions. On the contrary, start-
ing in early August 2011, the crisis became even
more virulent, spreading to Italy and Spain.
In this paper, we argue that the crisis worsened pri-
marily because the decisions of 21 July were incom-
plete on three fronts:
• Given the cascade financing structure, there is an
even lower de-facto limit on the borrowing capac-
ity of the EFSF than set by the governments;
• The largely overlooked demand for collateral by
some creditors resulted in the ill fated Finnish-
Greek bilateral agreement.
• Given its borrowing limits, it was never clear how
the EFSF could engage in substantial secondary
market purchases in case of a liquidity crunch in a
bond market (a key point, considering the reluc-
tance of the ECB to engage in large-scale bond
purchases of financially troubled governments).
The purpose of this contribution is to show how all
three weaknesses can be addressed by a combination
of two measures:
• Registering the EFSF as a bank, thus giving it
access to the ECB (or rather euro-system) refi-
nancing for its secondary market purchases, if
required to protect financial stability.
• The introduction of “VAT bonds” to finance
adjustment programmes for countries in difficul-
ties and assist debt restructuring if otherwise
unavoidable.
A Greek warning
Canaries used to be kept in coal mines because they
die faster than humans when exposed to dangerous
gases. When the birds stopped singing, miners knew
that it was time to prepare for an emergency.Greece,
as it turns out,was the euro zone’s canary.It was nev-
ertheless resuscitated,and a small rescue mechanism
was set up to revive a further canary or two – but
beyond this the warning was ignored. The miners
kept on working. They convinced themselves that
this was the canary’s problem.
The problems of Greece should have been recog-
nised as the first manifestation of a general problem,
namely that the global crisis was spreading to public
debt as capital markets refused to refinance exces-
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1 See: http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/communiques-de-
presse/2011/zone-euro-finances-publiques-la-lettre-du. 11797. htmlsive levels of public debt,especially in the euro zone,
whose members can no longer rely on central bank
support.
This has become particularly evident since the
European Council of July 2011 – the meeting that
was supposed to end the crisis by settling the Greek
case with a mixture of generous long-term financing
at low interest rates and some private sector re-
scheduling and restructuring.
The Greek public might not realise it, but it has
received preferential treatment from the EU. With
the decisions taken at the July European Council,
Greece essentially has all its financing needs ar-
ranged for the next decade and is assured of paying
less than 4 percent on the new debt it is incurring.2
The two other countries with a programme, Ireland
and Portugal, will have similarly low interest rates
and loans with extended periods of maturity, but
they are still expected to face the test of the markets
in a few years’ time.
The spread of debt fears 
But while Greece, Ireland and Portugal obtained
lower rates for their official long-term financing,
Spain and Italy experienced a surge in their borrow-
ing costs: before the intervention
of the ECB they were paying
more than 6 percent for ten-year
money.
It is clear that these countries can-
not be expected to provide bil-
lions of euros in credits to Greece
(and Portugal and Ireland) at ap-
proximately 3.5 percent when they
themselves are paying so much
more. Europe’s leaders wanted to
be generous to Greece, but the
supply of cheap funds is limited.
Not everybody can be served this
way.How much would be needed
for a hypothetical programme for
these two countries? Assuming
that they would need about the
same amount in proportion to their GDP as Greece,
a first, short, programme for these two countries
would probably need to amount to about EUR
800 billion (equal to the financing needs of these
two countries over the next three years), counting
on an additional EUR 240 billion from the IMF.A
second, longer-term programme for these two
countries would require an additional EUR 1 tril-
lion (again taking Greece’s needs as a proportion
of GDP as a guide and assuming that the IMF at
that point would no longer be able to contribute
substantially).
The total amount needed from European sources for
a full, longer-term “bail out” of the entire periphery
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain – or
GIIPS) would thus be more than EUR 2 trillion, or
more than 20 percent of the euro zone’s GDP
(Table 1). For purposes of comparison, consider that
the total EU-27 national contribution to the EU
2011 budget amounts to EUR 108 billion, the ECB
total assets to EUR 1.9 thousand billion and its paid-
up capital to EUR 5 trillion.
Obviously these calculations border more on eco-
nomic fiction than on a concrete possibility. And if
Spain and Italy were actually to lose market access,
the euro zone would be close to the breaking point
anyway.
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Table 1  










  1 Greece 80 30
  2 Ireland 40 23
  3 Portugal 52 26
  4 Greece: financing until 2014 
    (with PSI)
71 33
Total 1–4 243 112
  5 Ireland: financing until 2014 70 –
  6 Portugal: financing until 2014 76 –
Total 1–6 389 112
  7 Spain: short-term financing plan 325 162 487
  8 Italy: short-term financing plan 477 238 715
Total 1–8 1,190 913 1,590
  9 Spain: long-term financing plan 485 – 485
10 Italy: long-term financing plan 715 – 715
Total 1–10 2,390 913 2,790
as % of euro zone GDP 24 28
as % of peripheral euro zone public
debt
76 89
as % of euro zone bank assets 7 9
 Source: Authors’ own calculations.
2 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
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The EFSF was designed for a peripheral crisis
In particular, the euro zone rescue fund, the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), simply does
not, and will not, have enough funds to undertake
the massive bond purchases required to stabilise
markets. It was sized to provide emergency financial
support only to small peripheral countries such as
Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
Moreover, the structure of the EFSF makes it vul-
nerable to a domino effect.
• The rules of the EFSF imply that a country that
encounters financial difficulties and asks for sup-
port from the EFSF can “step out”, i.e., no longer
provide guarantees for any further debt issuance
by the EFSF (See Art. 2(7) of the EFSF Frame-
work Agreement).3
• Even if it is not explicitly regulated, it can be ex-
pected that a country facing high borrowing costs
(as in the case of Italy and Spain if rates stay at
crisis level) will step out as guarantor and only the
core Eurozone members would remain to back
the EFSF.
At this point, the debt burden on the core countries
would become unbearable. Since the step-out mech-
anism modifies the key percentage in the EFSF, the
relative weights of the two biggest countries, France
and Germany, continue to increase with each new
country needing financial assistance. Table 2 shows
how the share of Germany would increase to about
43 percent of the total if all five GIIPS were to need
help and thus “step out”.
Another implication of the step-out mechanism is
that each time a country “steps out”, the effective
lending capacity diminishes,as shown in Table 3.This
implies that the EFSF would have to have an initial
volume of over EUR 4 trillion in order for the re-
maining guarantees to be sufficient to finance Spain
and Italy. This colossal amount is also far greater
than the amount recently agreed for the ESM,which
was intended as the last and definitive EU answer to
the crisis: it, in fact, will have (only) a total sub-
scribed capital of EUR 700 billion, with an effective
lending capacity of EUR 500 billion.
Dangers of applying the periphery solution to the
core
This implies that a larger EFSF is not the solution; if
anything it could accelerate the fall of the dominoes.
The position of the French government – that the
EFSF should be increased – does not make sense
even from an insular French point of view because
financial markets have understood this risk and are
driving up borrowing costs for France – the core
country most in danger of losing its AAA rating.At
the moment France provides 22 percent of EFSF’s
total guarantees, around EUR 90 billion, destined to
become 158 after the ratification of the extended
EFSF.But if France loses its triple-A status and then
has to “step out” of the EFSF, only Germany (and
some of its smaller neighbours) would be left to
carry the whole burden.This would not only be polit-
ically unacceptable but also economically impossible
– the Italian government debt alone is equivalent to
the entire GDP of Germany.
At the moment the extended EFSF’s AAA rating re-
lies on those of six countries:Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands, which to-
gether provide exactly EUR 450 billion (Table 4). If
France lost their AAA rating,the remaining five coun-
Table 2 
Increasing weights of Germany and France (in %)
Step out sequence Germany France
Starting point 27.1 20.4
Step out: Greece 27.9 21.0
Stepout: Greece and Ireland 28.4 21.3
Step out: Greece, Ireland and
Portugal
29.1 21.9
Step out: Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain 33.4 25.1
Step out: Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Italy 42.9 32.2




Progressive erosionof the EU effective lending capacity
(billions of euro)
Step out sequence EFSF
Extended
EFSF
Starting amount 250 440
Step out: Greece 243 428
Stepout: Greece and Ireland 238 421
Step out: Greece, Ireland and
Portugal 232 409
Step out: Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain 203 357
Step out: Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Italy
158 278
 Source: Authors’ own calculations.ties would have to raise their guarantees in order to
maintain the same rating level: Germany to EUR
325 billion, the Netherlands to 69,Austria to 33, Fin-
land to 22 and Luxembourg to 3. Undoubtedly the
path of parliamentary ratification of the new EFSF
would become more difficult, considering the reac-
tions of respective national taxpayers.The alternative
would be an increase in borrowing cost; after all, if
America is rated double-A plus, why can’t the EFSF
be double-A plus? However, higher borrowing costs
for the EFSF would translate to higher funding costs
for countries receiving support, reducing the pro-
spects for retaining or restoring their solvency.
Towards an effective European Monetary Fund 
Thus,the financing of the EFSF,has become the cen-
tral issue for the euro crisis as it reaches the core.
Under the impression of a seemingly insolvable pro-
blem more and more observers argue that “euro
bonds” are the only way out. Proponents often do
not specify what is meant by this, but the term “euro
bonds” usually means a bond which is jointly and
severally guaranteed by all euro area member states.
In some variants of the euro bond proposals member
states could issue at least part of their own debt in
the form of euro bonds. The issuance of such bonds
on a large scale would of course amount to a huge
transfer of risk (from the creditor to the debtor
countries). Moreover, a fiscally sound small country
might in the end be liable for a large part of euro
area public debt should some of
the larger countries simply refuse
to pay up.We do not support this
approach. However, we believe
that some limited form of a com-
mon bond could be used to
finance the rescue operations of
the EFSF.
Thus, we propose a two-pillar
structure to finance the embryo
of a European Monetary Fund as
it exists in the form of the EFSF
today.We propose that rescue op-
erations which involve at least the
danger of insolvency are financed
via a fiscal instrument, whereas
pure liquidity support in the form
of secondary market bond pur-
chases to secure financial stability
is financed by rediscounting secondary market oper-
ations at the ECB. In short:
• Department 1: it would manage and fund adjust-
ment programmes and, in case adjustment is im-
possible without debt reduction, facilitate orderly
debt restructuring along the lines of the Brady
Plan. Adjustment funding and help for debt re-
structuring would be backed fully by the support
from member states and from VAT bonds.
• Department 2: the financial stability department
would counter liquidity logjams in euro area sov-
ereign bond markets that jeopardise financial sta-
bility by intervening in secondary markets For
secondary market purchases it could access the
ECB’s refinance window, provided the ECB and
the ESRB agree that this is needed to avert sys-
temic risk.
Department 1: VAT euro bonds instead of euro
bonds?
There is an alternative to the actual system of bilat-
eral limited guarantees. The EFSF could finance its
rescue operations (as argued above, only those
where there is at least a remote danger of insolven-
cy) by issuing bonds which are backed jointly and
severally by the VAT revenues (and only these rev-
enues) of all euro area member countries.
The EFSF should be able to call up rather large
resources this way given that in the euro area total
VAT revenues amount to about EUR 700 billion
annually (about 7 percent of GDP), which is already
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Table 4 
Actual ratings of euro zone members (August 2011) 
Euro area 




Austria Aaa AAA AAA 3.0
Belgium Aa1 AA+ AA+ 3.7
Cyprus A2 A– A– 0.2
Finland Aaa AAA AAA 1.9
France Aaa AAA AAA 21.9
Germany Aaa AAA AAA 29.1
Greece Caa1 CCC B+ step out
Ireland Baa3 BBB+ BBB+ step out
Italy Aa2 A+ AA– 19.2
Luxembourg Aaa AAA AAA 0.3
Malta A1 A A+ 0.1
Netherlands Aaa AAA AAA 6.1
Portugal Baa1 BBB– BBB– step out
Slovakia A1 A+ A+ 1.1
Slovenia Aa2 AA AA 0.5
Spain Aa2 AA AA+ 12.8
Sources: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch and author’s calculations.CESifo DICE Report 3/2011 35
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substantially more than the EUR 440 billion fore-
seen at present.4
VAT bonds would be different from euro bonds in
two important aspects:
• These bonds would not be backed by the full faith
of all member states,but only their VAT revenues,
which limits the risk for the fiscally stronger
member countries.
• No member country could ever be asked to pay
more than its current VAT revenues for the ser-
vice of the VAT bonds issued by the EFSF. This
also limits the risk, especially for smaller member
countries which might otherwise be liable for a
large batch of euro bonds if the larger member
countries were to refuse to pay up.
Moreover, VAT revenues, which at present are all
national,could (and should) at the same time also be
used to secure debt service by programme country to
the EFSF. Countries under an EFSF/ESM pro-
gramme would have to submit their local VAT to EU
control, with a certain, pre- specified part of the rev-
enues no longer accruing to the national treasury,
but going directly to the EFSF (or future ESM) until
the loans have been fully repaid.
For example, in the case of Greece, VAT revenues
amount to 6.5 percent of GDP,or about EUR 13 bil-
lion annually, which is more than the total paid by
the Greek government on its debt. Even with only
one half of this sum Greece could guarantee the
interest payments on more than 100 billion in loans.
Of course the debtor country would have to agree
that any change in VAT rates or the definition of the
base be subject to a veto by the EFSF/ESM.
The VAT bonds would thus be es-
sentially some variant of covered
bonds which limits the risk to the
creditor countries. Given that for
all countries VAT revenues are
larger than interest on debt, the
value of the collateral should be
enough to provide creditors with
a very high degree of security,
thus justifying a rather low interest rate.For the euro
area as a whole VAT revenues amount to over 6 per-
cent of GDP whereas interest payments on govern-
ment bonds are less than 3 percent of GDP.
It is clear that VAT bonds cannot solve all problems.
In particular the de facto seniority of VAT bonds
would of course lower the value of the remaining
government bonds,which are guaranteed only by the
“general obligation”of the government.However,as
the recent case of Finland’s demand for collateral
from Greece shows there is anyway a tendency by
the creditor countries to seek out some security for
their lending to potentially insolvent countries.
In sum, using VAT revenues as a way both to under-
pin “euro rescue bonds” and repayment by debtor
countries would thus have a number of advantages:
• It would limit the risk for the fiscally virtuous
countries as argued above. Given that the maxi-
mum at stake is VAT revenues.
• The base for VAT has already been to a large
extent harmonised and the tax rates which are
fixed by member countries are subject to a corri-
dor ensuring in practice a fair amount of har-
monisation of VAT revenues (around 6–7 per-
cent of GDP).
• VAT taxes only consumption. A country with a
debt problem needs in the first instance to in-
crease exports, which are not subject to VAT.
Export led growth would thus not lead to higher
debt service. Only once domestic consumption
starts to grow again would debt service increase.
• VAT revenues could be “unionised” for pro-
gramme countries, providing a further guarantee
for the creditors.
4 With private consumption amounting to
about 55 percent of euro area GDP on av-
erage,VAT should yield about 10 percent
of GDP in revenues at a full rate of close
to 20 percent.The existence of zero-rated
goods lowers the yield to about 7 percent
of GDP, but the differences among mem-
ber countries in VAT revenues seem to be
manageable.
Table 5 












on debt as % of
GDP
EU-27 6.7 58.3 11.5 2.7
EZ-16 6.6 57.6 11.5 2.8
Germany 7.4 58.9 12.6 2.4
Ireland 6.4 50.6 12.6 3.3
Greece 6.3 73.5 8.6 5.5
Spain 4.1 56.6 7.2 1.9
France 6.8 58.0 11.7 2.5
Italy 5.7 60.0 9.5 4.4
Portugal 7.1 65.8 10.8 3.0
Sources: Eurostat and AMECO, 2009 data (2010 for interest service).The introduction of VAT bonds should, of course, be
complemented by strengthening even further VAT
base harmonisation.But this is already on the official
agenda. Euro area countries would also have to sat-
isfy certain general rules on their VAT rates and the
VAT base relative to consumption to ensure that no
country can escape its obligations by either arbitrar-
ily lowering VAT rates or increasing the array of goods
and services subject to lower or zero VAT. Table 5
shows that Spain, for example, stands out as collecting
an unusually small amount of VAT revenues.
VAT bonds, which would extend the covered bond
concept to public debt, concentrate on the one area
of taxation which is already largely harmonised and
with limited risks for the creditor countries.
Department 2: face liquidity problems
The second department – we will call it the financial
stability department – would counter liquidity logjams
in euro area sovereign bond markets by intervening in
secondary markets (see Table 6 for European bank
exposures to potentially risky government debt). The
European Council of 21 July 2011 opened the way for
the EFSF to buy bonds in the secondary market.So far
it has been envisaged that the EFSF could merely,as an
exception, intervene in the primary market in the con-
text of a programme with strict conditionality.The new
instrument is highly desirable given the current state of
uncertainty in the markets, but it would remain mean-
ingless without an increase in the lending capacity of
the EFSF. In fact, after providing full financing until
2014 for the GIPs,an extended EFSF would have prac-
tically no resources left, given that its lending capacity
would be about EUR 409 billion, not much more than
the EUR 390 required for the GIPs.
Smaller secondary market intervention in case of limit-
ed liquidity gaps could be funded with EFSF’s resources
(similar to the operations in the first department).How-
ever, in case of a big liquidity crunch, the EFSF could
access ECB facilities by borrowing against the govern-
ment bonds it is purchasing as collateral.Assuming that
the ECB insists on the top quality of the assets it takes
for collateral – as, for instance, assured by a high rating
– it would ensure that it only lends in case of a liquidity
crunch and not when a country suffers insolvency. The
decision to intervene to buy national government bonds
in order to protect financial stability would be taken by
the EMF, based on expert assessments and under the
supervision of the finance ministers in conjunction with
the ECB (as already foreseen in the conclusions to the
European Council of 21 July) and the European Sys-
temic Risk Board.Hence,the ECB,whose task is not to
determine fiscal policy in specific countries,would again
be able to look after price and financial stability for the
euro area as a whole.Moreover,credit risk would fall on
the EFSF’s balance sheet.
Our proposal is institutionally far superior to the pre-
sent arrangement, where the ECB uses its SMP to
pressure the Italian government into reforms and fiscal
adjustment. There is no representation of the Euro-
pean tax payers on the Governing Council of the ECB,
which might have a tendency to be overly concerned
about instability in financial markets and have too lit-
tle regard for the interests of taxpayers.
The ECB would still be able to control liquidity de-
velopments for the entire euro area because once fi-
nancial markets have returned to normal it could
simply stop its policy of full allotment.At this point
any refinancing by the EFSF would simply crowd
out financing to other banks and thus not increase
area-wide liquidity.
Backstopping the EFSF via the
ECB – i.e., creating an EMF –
would have the advantage over
the current situation in that it
leaves the management of public
debt problems in the hands of the
finance ministries and provides
them with the liquidity backstop
that is needed when there is a gen-
eralised breakdown of confidence.
In a crisis of confidence the funda-
mental problem of banks and gov-
ernments is always one of liquidity.
This is exactly when a lender of
last resort is most needed.
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Table 6 
European bank exposure towards peripheral countries









Greece 90.1 79.0 82.7
Ireland 19.3 16.5 15.8
Portugal 40.2 32.8 37.6
Subtotal 149.6 128.3 136.1
Spain 287.0 203.2 264.4
Italy 325.9 265.7 286.3
Total periphery 762.5 597.1 686.8
 Source: European Banking Authority 2011 EU-wide Stress Test Aggregate 
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The ECB is the only institution that can provide the
required “lending of last resort” quickly and in con-
vincing quantities. It would of course be much better if
the ECB did not have to bail out the European rescue
mechanism,but in this case one has to choose between
two evils.As long as it is temporary, even a massive in-
crease in the ECB’s balance sheet constitutes a lesser
evil than a breakdown of the euro zone financial system.
But would our proposal be consistent with the Eu-
ropean treaties? We think so. Article 123, §1 of the
AEUV forbids direct ECB credit to public institutions
so as to avoid monetary financing of fiscal deficits.
However,Article 123, §2 exempts banks owned by the
public sector from this prohibition.Thus, public banks
such as the European Investment Bank or the German
KfW (which extends the German contribution to the
funds for the adjustment programme to Greece) have
access to ECB windows. Moreover, Council Regula-
tion no. 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 exempts the
IMF and the balance-of-payments-assistance-facility
(renamed to EFSM) from the prohibition of receiving
ECB funds.Hence,we do not see a serious legal obsta-
cle to giving emergency access to ECB funds to the
department of the EMF charged with the prevention
of financial crises through intervention in secondary
sovereign bond markets (see Annex for further discus-
sion). To the contrary, we believe that our proposal
would help to end a situation in which the ECB goes
against the spirit of Article 123 and to avoid other cur-
rently discussed alternatives that would be politically
and legally even more dangerous.
The dangers of introducing a political union with-
out democratic legitimacy
Another solution touted by some has been to estab-
lish joint and several liability for euro area countries’
debt by introducing euro bonds. The danger here is
that holding tax-payers fully and unconditionally
liable for spending decisions taken in other countries
would most likely turn into a poison pill for the EMU.
Political resistance against the EMU would rise in the
stronger countries, eventually leading to a probable
break-up of the EMU. Moreover, if the issuance of
euro bonds were limited to a part of the national debt
(say only 40–60 percent of GDP as proposed), highly
indebted countries would immediately be forced into
a debt restructuring as they could no longer find buy-
ers for the part only guaranteed nationally.5 More-
over,this approach would require a change in the EU
treaties and would probably not be compatible with
the German constitution.
Another variant of euro bonds would be for all euro
area countries to provide a “joint and several” guar-
antee for the EFSF. This would have still have most
of the political disadvantages mentioned above, but
at least it would not create the additional problems
of the blue/red bond proposal.
Whatever the variant, euro bonds would only make
sense in a political union, and even then only when
debt levels are low.6 When starting debt levels are so
high that the markets suspect a debt overhang euro
bonds would amount to a large transfer of risk and,
of course, strong expectations that future accumula-
tions of debt will be treated in the same way.
No silver bullet
Bringing the EMU back to safe ground will of course
only succeed if debt and deficits are reduced substan-
tially.The financial crisis has clearly demonstrated that
excessive debt loads and new deficits cannot be fi-
nanced in anything but extremely benign markets.
Countries that accumulate excessive debt will inevit-
ably experience their “Minsky moment”, when the rol-
ling of this debt becomes impossible.For a stable EMU
a long-term programme of debt reduction is a conditio
sine qua non. However, debt reduction takes time,
hence the need for an effective crisis management
mechanism along the lines sketched out above. One
without the other will not work,and the EMU will fail.
Our proposal will certainly dissatisfy the purists who
regard the EMU as the re-birth of the gold standard.
For the purists, our proposal amounts to a thinly
veiled monetary financing of government debt. We
would respond by saying that in the real world of
today a pure gold standard-like arrangement will not
work. In today’s environment, the central bank
needs to look after financial stability, which means
that it must assume the role of a lender of last resort
to banks and – because of the bank-government-
debt nexus described above – also governments.The
question is not whether, but how this role is per-
formed.
5 It could be different if, in case of default, part of the bonds – say
that consistent with a 60 percent debt ratio – were guaranteed by
the community of euro area states (through a provision in the bond
covenant). In this case, the guarantee would only be effective in
case of default while market participants would have a better idea
of the recovery value.
6 The federal government of the newly created US assumed the
debt of the founding states because that debt was incurred while
fighting for a common cause. This is certainly not the case in
Europe today.Annex: Legal issues
It might be argued that our proposal is not compatible
with the prohibition of monetary financing of public
bodies. However, this is not the case. The financial sta-
bility department of the EMF would essentially per-
form the same function as many private sector invest-
ment funds located (in Luxemburg and elsewhere)
which are recognised as MFIs by the ECB and thus
have access to normal eurosystem refinancing. These
funds usually specialise in investing in euro area gov-
ernment bonds. The EMF could thus just create a spe-
cial sub-vehicle (“distressed debt”) whose purpose
would be only to buy bonds on the secondary market.
This vehicle could thus be operated just like any invest-
ment fund which invests in “distressed” debt (i.e., buy
when yields are high). This sub vehicle would not
extend credit to governments, it would only perform a
function that is undertaken today by the eurosystem
itself.There is thus no material reason why this activity
should fall under the prohibition of the ECB to finance
governments (Article 123 of the TFEU).
Article 123(1) states:
“Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility
with the European Central Bank or with the central
banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as
‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions,
bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, region-
al, local or other public authorities, other bodies gov-
erned by public law, or public undertakings of Member
States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly
from them by the European Central Bank or national
central banks of debt instruments”.
The key legal point in this article hinges on the status of
the EFSF/EMF rather than on who ultimately benefits
from the funding the ECB provides. The key issue
would then be whether the EMF falls under any of the
categories listed in Article 123 paragraph 1.Nowhere in
Article 123(1) is there a reference to indirect funding or
the purpose for which access to ECB funding is to be
made; there is simply a prohibition on certain classes of
entity from receiving ECB monetary financing.7
One could of course argue since the EFSF is fully
owned by governments, it falls under the category of
“public undertakings”. However,Article 123(1) did not
prevent the European Investment Bank (an EU body,
but with a distinct legal personality, registered in Lu-
xembourg, like the EFSF andowned by member states
and the Commission) from obtaining refinancing from
the ECB.In 2009 the EIB was recognised as an “eligible
counterparty” by the ECB with access to ECB refi-
nancing “as any other counterparty”.As the ECB itself
explains in a press release of 7 May 2009, this was “a
natural complement to the EIB’s financing initiatives”.
The reason is that paragraph 2 of the same article pro-
vides an exemption:
Article 123(2) reads:
“2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit
institutions which,in the context of the supply of reserves
by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by
national central banks and the European Central Bank
as private credit institutions.”
This means that the EFSF (or perhaps only its financial
stability arm) could benefit from the exception in
Article 123 paragraph 2,if it were considered a publicly-
owned “credit institution”. Given that, as mentioned
above, a number of investment funds are recognised as
credit institutions there is no substantial reason why this
should not be possible.
We note that in Germany the bilateral loans to Greece
have been channelled via the KfW (Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau), which is also fully owned by the govern-
ment and not a bank in the narrow sense of the word.
However, the KfW is an “eligible counterparty” for the
ECB as it is registered as an MFI. The KfW could thus
refinance its lending to Greece (now over EUR 10 bil-
lion) via the ECB if it wanted to.
When in 2013 the ESM replaces the EFSF, it will be-
come a public law institution. However, this should not
be a real obstacle.The EIB provides a key analogy here,
as the EIB is certainly a public body (and publicly-
owned). In the ECJ’s case law, the EIB is legally
deemed an autonomous entity distinct from the EU but
nonetheless a body intended to contribute towards the
attainment of the Union’s objectives.As a result, it falls
outside the category of entities listed in Article 123
paragraph 1.
Finally, the most direct way to ensure that access by the
EFSF/EMF to the refinancing operations of the ECB
does not encounter legal obstacles would be to simply
make a small change in Article 7 of Council Regulation
(EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993,8 which exempts
both the financing of the IMF and the financial assistance
to non-euro area membership from the scope of Article
123. Given that financial assistance to euro-area member
states will also soon have a treaty base (via the addition to
Article 136, which has already been unofficially agreed),
it would be appropriate to deal with the assistance to euro
area member states.A change in the Council Regulation
could be agreed quickly by the heads of state.
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7 Those arguing against our proposal focus on what the ECB fund-
ing to the EFSF will be used for,i.e.,indirect government financing,
but neither Article 123 nor Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 men-
tion indirect financing.Article 123 only refers to direct financing.
8 “The financing by the European Central Bank or the national
central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis
the International Monetary Fund or resulting from the implemen-
tation of the medium-term financial assistance facility set up by
Regulation (EEC) No 1969/88 (4) shall not be regarded as a credit
facility within the meaning of Article 104 of the Treaty.”